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Case Comment
Governmental Liability for Customs Officials'
Negligence: Kosak v. United States
On February 28, 1978, Customs Service officials seized anti-
ques and art objects from the home of Joseph Kosak.1 Kosak
was charged with smuggling these goods into the United States
in violation of section 545 of Title XVIII of the United States
Code.2 A jury found Kosak innocent of the charges, 3 and a year
later the Customs Service returned his detained property.4
Kosak contended, however, that certain items had been dam-
aged during detention as a result of negligent handling by Cus-
toms Service employees. Asserting jurisdiction under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),5 Kosak brought an action
against the United States seeking $12,310 in damages. The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint,6 finding the claim barred
1. Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306, 307 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-618).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976) (prohibiting the illegal importation of goods).
3. Kosak was acquitted of any customs violations on May 8, 1978. Petition
for Cert., Kosak v. United States, 674 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1982),filed, 51 U.S.LW.
3305 (U.S.) (Sept. 21, 1982) (No. 82-618).
4. According to the Petition for Certiorari, on September 29, 1978, the Cus-
toms Service forwarded a "Notice of Penalty" to Kosak informing him that his
art collection was being forfeited. This occurred after Kosak had been found
innocent of all customs violations. Id. No explanation for the customs officials'
action appears in the record. Although Kosak then filed a petition to have his
collection returned, he did not receive the items until June 1, 1979. Id.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976). Section 1346(b) specifically
provides:
(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of
the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
6. Kosak v. United States, No. 81-2054 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1981) (order grant-
ing motion to dismiss).
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by section 2680 of the FTCA, and Kosak appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,8 holding that section
2680(c), the provision of the FTCA barring claims "arising in re-
spect of the detention of any goods or merchandise by an of-
ficer of Customs," precluded any claim against the United
States for negligent damage to property while in the legitimate
custody of the Customs Service, whether the claim arose from
conversion due to the fact of detention or from negligent han-
dling during detention. Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983)
(No. 82-618).
The concept of sovereign immunity underlying section
2680(c) originated from the premise that "the King can do no
wrong."9 The United States Supreme Court first adopted this
doctrine in 1821,10 and thereafter courts consistently held that
"the government is not liable to be sued, except with its own
consent, given by law."" Because of the harsh effects of the
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976). Section 2680 contains thirteen exceptions to
the FTCA general waiver of immunity. See infra note 21. Pursuant to subsec-
tion (c), the waiver of immunity does not apply to "any claim arising in respect
of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of
any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-
enforcement officer." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976).
8. 679 F.2d at 308. For a strong dissent filed by Judge Weis, see 679 F.2d at
309.
9. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239, 241-42. Sovereign immunity
had its roots in feudalism and theology, and was carried over to this country
from the law of England. 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING OF FEDERAL TORT CiAms § 51
(1982); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 515-18 (2d ed.
1923); Holdsworth, A History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 LQ. REv. 141,
142 (1922). Its survival in the United States after the Revolutionary War, which
was fought to eliminate government by a sovereign, is ironic and more likely
attributable "to the financial instability of the infant American states rather
than to the stability of the doctrine's theoretical foundations." Gellhorn &
Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 CoLuM. L REV. 722,
722 (1947).
10. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) ('The uni-
versally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted
against the United States .... "). The doctrine had previously been mentioned
in dicta. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456-58 (1793).
11. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846). See also
The Western Main, 257 U.S. 419,433 (1922); Gellhorn & Schenck, supra note 9, at
722 (indicating that sovereign immunity was so absolute that "citation of sup-
porting authorities soon became unnecessary").
A rationale for the sovereign immunity doctrine was suggested by Justice
Story, who observed that the government "does not undertake to guarantee to
any persons the fidelity of any of the officers or agents whom it employs; since
that would involve it, in all its operations in endless embarrassment, and diffi-
culties, and losses, which would be subversive of the public interests." J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 390 (9th ed. 1882). Other judges
have agreed in principle, although for different reasons. See, e.g., Kawananakoa
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sovereign immunity doctrine, Congress routinely enacted "spe-
cial legislation," bills that individually compensated certain vic-
tims for injuries caused by government employees.12 These
bills, however, were only narrow exceptions to the prevailing
law of sovereign immunity. Since many victims still received
no compensation, the theory of governmental immunity contin-
ued to receive sharp criticism.13 Moreover, Congress became
overburdened by the thousands of pieces of special legislation
introduced at every session.14 As a result, Congress began to
narrow the scope of sovereign immunity.
The sacrosanct character of sovereign immunity was un-
dercut as early as 1877 with the passage of the Tucker Act,
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1906) (Holmes, J.) ("A sovereign is exempt from
suit... on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."); Moffat
v. United States, 112 U.S. 24, 31 (1884) (Field, J.) ('They [government officers]
are but the servants of the law, and, if they depart from its requirements, the
government is not bound. There would be a wild license to crime if their acts,
in disregard of the law, were to be upheld to protect third parties .... "); Gib-
bons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274-75 (1868) (Miller, J.) (Court of
Claims has no authority to allow suit against the United States in the absence
of precedent).
12. Congress derives its authority to compensate for government-caused
losses from article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution, which provides that
"[t]he Congress shall have power ... to pay the Debts ... of the United
States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. The Supreme Court confirmed that these debts
include not only those "evidenced by some written obligation or ... otherwise
of a strictly legal character," but also include "those debts or claims which rest
upon a merely equitable or honorary obligation, and which would not be recov-
erable in a court of law if existing against an individual." United States v. Re-
alty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440 (1896).
13. See, e.g., Bochard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort V & VI, 36 YALE
L.J. 757, 1039 (1926-27). For a compilation of earlier criticisms of sovereign im-
munity, see Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No
Clothes, 1966 U. I. L.F. 828, 847; Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or His-
tory?, 30 NAACA L.J. 404, 418 (1963). Criticism of sovereign immunity was
largely premised on the belief that it was unfair to deny recovery to innocent
victims simply because they were injured by the government in circumstances
where a private employer would be liable. Mikva, supra, at 847. See also infra
note 89.
Despite this criticism, complete sovereign immunity in tort existed in this
country for approximately 125 years. The doctrine's demise was delayed for
several reasons; the most important reason was the fear that allowing recovery
against the government would threaten the federal treasury, endanger impor-
tant policies and goals, and ultimately affect the stability of the government.
Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in France, 29 N.Y.U. L REv. 1432, 1456-59 (1954).
14. The time and expense required to process the bills that were intro-
duced each year, and especially by the two hundred or so that were actually
enacted, burdened Congress to the extent of over $40,000 in 1940 dollars, exclud-
ing amounts appropriated to compensate victims. See Gellhorn & Schenck,
supra note 9, at 725; Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Inter-
pretation, 35 GEO. L. REV. 1, 4 (1946); Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56
YALE L.J. 534, 535 (1947).
1042 f[Vol. 67:1040
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
which provided that the government could be sued for any
claim "not sounding in tort."1 5 Congress subsequently enacted
the Suits in Admiralty Act,16 the Public Vessels Act,17 and the
Small Tort Claims Act, a statute enabling the heads of federal
agencies to settle claims for property damage of up to $1,000.18
The trend toward narrowing the scope of sovereign immunity
culminated in 1946 with passage of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.19
The FTCA imposes tort liability on the government in situ-
ations in which an individual committing the same act would
be liable.20 The Act, however, does not totally eliminate sover-
eign immunity in tort. Section 2680 lists thirteen areas in which
15. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a) (2) (1976)). The Tucker Act provides for liability in any action
"founded... upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or uniquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Id. An
action may be brought under the Tucker Act only on contracts implied in fact,
as opposed to contracts implied in law. United States v. Minnesota Mutual In-
vestment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926).
Even before passing the Tucker Act, Congress had broadened the scope of
the government's consent to be sued. In 1855, Congress enacted the Court of
Claims Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 171
(1976)), which created a fact-finding tribunal to advise Congress on federal stat-
utes. An 1863 amendment empowered the Court of Claims to render judg-
ments. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 (1863) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 171 (1976)). 1 L JAYSON, supra note 9, § 53.
16. Act of March 9, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-156, 41 Stat. 525 (codified at 46
U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976)) (providing for suits in admiralty by or against vessels
or cargoes of the United States).
17. Act of March 3, 1925, Pub. L No. 68-546, 43 Stat. 1112 (codified at 46
U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1976)) (providing for suits against the United States for dam-
ages caused by public vessels or for towage or salvage services).
18. Act of Dec. 28, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-375, 42 Stat. 1066 (repealed 1946). In
addition, the Postmaster General was authorized to settle claims up to $500 for
personal injuries, Act of June 16, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-18, 42 Stat. 63 (repealed
1946), and the Attorney General was authorized to settle claims under $500 for
personal or property damage caused by members of the FBI, Act of Mar. 20,
1936, Pub. L. No. 74-481, 49 Stat. 1184 (repealed 1946). See also 1 L. JAYSON,
supra note 9, § 55.01-.24. These and most comparable acts were repealed by the
FTCA. Note, supra note 14, at 535 n.7.
19. Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L No. 79-601,
60 Stat. 842 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976)). Congress
attempted to pass the FTCA several times. A measure actually passed the 70th
Congress in 1929, but was pocket-vetoed by President Coolidge. Gellhorn &
Schenck, supra note 9, at 726.
After nearly thirty years of congressional consideration, the Federal Tort
Claims Act was passed in 1946, as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization
Act. Upon signing the Legislative Reorganization Act into law on August 2,
1946, President Truman called it "one of the most significant advances in the
organization of the Congress of the United States since the establishment of
that body." W. WRiGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS AcT 5 (1957).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See supra note 5.
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the government is still immune from liability.21 Because liabil-
ity for tortious government conduct became the rule under the
FTCA, some practical necessity had to justify each exception to
liability.22 For example, section 2680(c) was included in a cate-
gory of exemptions intended to exclude "claims which relate to
certain governmental activities which should be free from the
threat of damage suit, or for which adequate remedies are al-
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
The provisions of this chapter and § 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claimarising in respect of the assessment or collection of
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise
by any officer of Customs or excise or any other law-enforcement of-
ficer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752,
781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the
United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of an employee of
the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title
50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establish-
ment of a quarantine by the United States.
(g) Repealed....
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, mis-
representation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the mili-
tary or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
(in) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal
Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
Id.
22. For example, Congress regarded § 2680(a), which excludes claims aris-
ing from the performance of discretionary functions, as "extremely important
to preclude unwarranted judicial interference with the essential functions of
government." 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 9, § 236. Claims for which there was a
preexisting remedy under the Public Vessels Act or the Suits in Admiralty Act
were also excluded under § 2680(d), as any additional remedy was considered
unnecessary. Id. Many deliberate torts were excluded under § 2680(h), be-
cause Congress feared it would be difficult to defend suits of this nature and
that the government might be held liable for damages out of proportion to
those actually suffered. Id.
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ready available." 23  Despite congressional justifications, com-
mentators criticized many of the exceptions as unnecessary to
protect a significant governmental interest.24 Other exceptions,
however, such as section 2680(c), have been consistently con-
sidered noncontroversial, both by commentators25 and the
courts.
2 6
Alliance Assurance Company v. United States, 27 a 1958 Sec-
ond Circuit decision, marked the beginning of the controversy
as to the correct interpretation of section 2680(c). In Alliance,
a container of English woolens detained for inspection2 8 was
subsequently lost by U.S. customs officials.29 In a dramatic de-
23. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946). Claims under subsec-
tions (b), (e), (f), (i), (j), (k), (1), (m), and (n) were excluded for the same rea-
sons. Id. See supra note 21.
24. For example, § 2680(a), the exception for discretionary acts, was imme-
diately criticized as vague. See Gellhorn & Schenck, supra note 9, at 728-29;
Note, supra note 14, at 543. The first decision interpreting this subsection,
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), also indicated that subsection (a)
was an extremely broad waiver of liability. Id. at 26-36. Many commentators
disapproved of this decision. As a result, subsection (a) was cast into disfavor.
See, e.g., W. WRiGHT, supra note 19, at 14.
For a general criticism of the Federal Tort Claims Act exceptions, see Gell-
horn & Schenck, supra note 9.
25. Professor Wright included section 2680(c) in a list prefaced by the fol-
lowing explanation: 'The meaning of the following exclusions appears to be
too obvious to invite litigation concerning their interpretation or application
.... 1" W. WRGHT, supra note 19, at 22. That § 2680(c) was noncontroversial is
further indicated by the lack of attention devoted to that section in articles ex-
plaining the FICA soon after its enactment. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Schenck,
supra note 9, at 730; Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 45; Note, supra note 14, at 547-48
(exception should not be interpreted as excluding ordinary torts disassociated
with the direct administration of customs officials' duties).
26. See, e.g., United States v. 1500 Cases More or Less, Etc., 249 F.2d 382
(7th Cir. 1957) (courts held the Food and Drug Administration not liable for
pre-seizure storage charges on tomato paste wrongly intercepted by the govern-
ment); Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 139 F. Supp. 38 (D. Md. 1956)
(finding that if FBI agents had converted plaintiffs property they were not act-
ing within the scope of their employment, and if they had validly detained the
goods the suit was barred by § 2680(c)); United States v. One 1951 Cadillac
Coupe de Ville, 125 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (court refused to award dam-
ages for illegal seizure of an automobile); Chambers v. United States, 107 F.
Supp. 601 (D. Kan. 1952) (suit for replacement of liquor "misplaced" by the
Treasury Department dismissed as barred by § 2680(c)); Nakasheff v. Continen-
tal Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 87 (1950) (United States not liable for a quantity of Bel-
labulgaria lost by a customs officers). None of these cases questioned the
interpretation of § 2680(c); all simply dismissed the claim whenever govern-
ment employees were involved.
27. 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
28. The goods, valued at $2,460.59, were removed pursuant to a statute that
authorizes seizure of imported merchandise for inspection and determination
of duties. 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1976).
29. The district court found that the goods had disappeared from the Pub-
lic Stores (the official government warehouse) and that "the manner in which
10451983]
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parture from earlier interpretations, 30 the district court held
that section 2680(c) did not bar the claim against the United
States,31 although the court found no liability because the
plaintiff had failed to prove negligence. 32 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed,33 holding that the government
had been negligent and thus was liable.3 4 In reaching this re-
sult, the court of appeals upheld the district court's determina-
tion that section 2680(c) was not a bar to the suit.35
The Second Circuit gave several reasons for its conclusion
that section 2680(c) did not preclude the plaintiff's claim. The
court observed that section 2680(c) had previously been used to
bar actions based on the illegal seizure of goods, not actions for
damages during detention, as sought by Alliance Assurance
Company.36 Moreover, the court pointed out that the language
of section 2680(c) describes a significantly narrower exception
than the language of other sections. 3 7 For example, section
2680(b) expressly bars actions "arising out of the loss, miscar-
riage, or negligent transmission" of mail.38 The Alliance court
reasoned that had Congress wanted to bar actions arising out
they have vanished remains a mystery." Alliance Assurance Co. v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
30. Earlier cases considering § 2680(c) had never analyzed the section's
language, but had perfunctorily dismissed any claim related to the detention of
goods as barred by § 2680(c). See supra note 26. The district court in Alliance
was the first to specifically consider the statute's language and found that cer-
tain claims related to the detention of goods-those for damages caused by
negligent handling during detention-were not barred by § 2680(c). 146 F.
Supp. at 122.
31. 146 F. Supp. at 122.
32. Id. at 124.
33. 252 F.2d at 536.
34. Id. The court also found that the government was liable under the
Tucker Act for breach of an implied contract of bailment. See supra note 15;
infra note 68. The obligation to return the goods "was not artifically created in
law, but rather stemmed from an implied promise to redeliver the goods as
soon as Customs had checked them," and thus was covered by the Tucker Act.
252 F.2d at 532. The government did not contend that the bailment "Was 'invol-
untary' in the sense that the goods were thrust upon it;" therefore, since the
government voluntarily undertook a bailment of the goods, the court concluded
that "a promise on its part to use due care during the term of the bailment can
and should be implied." Id.
35. 252 F.2d at 534.
36. Id. The Alliance court cited Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,
139 F. Supp. 38 (D. Md. 1956), which involved charges that FBI agents had taken
and converted property during an arrest, and United States v. One 1951 Cadil-
lac Coupe de Ville, 125 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Mo. 1954), which involved the illegal
seizure of an automobile, for this proposition. For additional cases decided
prior to Alliance and based on claims of illegal seizure of goods, see supra note
26.
37. 252 F.2d at 534.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1976).
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of the negligent loss, destruction, or injury of goods by customs
officials, the language in subsection (c) would have been as ex-
plicit as that of subsection (b).39 The court concluded that
Congress could not have meant to extend absolution to all
agencies for careless handling of others' property,40 and deter-
mined that section 2680(c) was simply intended to prohibit ac-
tions for conversion arising from the denial by customs
authorities of another's immediate right of dominion or control
over goods.41
Other courts, however, did not immediately embrace the
Second Circuit's interpretation of section 2680(c). In S. Schon-
feld Co. v. S.S. Akra Tenaron,42 the plaintiff claimed that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was liable for a ship-
ment of canned Spanish tomatoes that the FDA had negligently
ordered destroyed.43 The Schonfeld court found nothing in the
statute's language to indicate that erroneous seizure should be
distinguished from negligent handling of goods properly
seized,44 and thus rejected Alliance as "an anomoly in the case
law construing § 2680(c) ."45 A year later the Fifth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in United States v. One (1) 1972
Wood, 19-Foot Custom Boat.4 6 In 19-Foot Boat, customs offi-
cials seized a boat used for transporting marijuana. The boat's
owner sued for damages to the craft and revenues lost while
the boat was detained.47 The court refused to differentiate be-
tween claims for damages due to the fact of detention and
those for damages due to negligent handling during detention,
holding that the owners's claims were barred because "28
U.S.C. § 2680 specifically prohibits the bringing of any claim
arising from the detention of any goods or merchandise by a
customs officer."40
39. 252 F.2d at 534.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 363 F. Supp. 1220 (IIS.C. 1973).
43. Id. at 1220.
44. Id. at 1223.
45. Id. The Court stated that it had uncovered no other cases that adopted
the Alliance court's position. Id. at 1224.
46. 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. The owner had rented the boat to a third party and was innocent of
any wrongdoing. Id. at 1329. After seizing the boat, customs officials agreed to
remit it to its owner upon payment of storage charges of $400. Id. When the
owner refused to pay these charges, the United States commenced forfeiture
proceedings. The owner counterclaimed for damages.
48. Id. at 1330 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit has since interpreted
this case as consistent with Alliance, however. See infra notes 135-38 and ac-
companying text.
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Recently, however, the Alliance rationale has gained favor
among appellate courts. In A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret
Service, 49 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the United
States liable for damage done to a rare silver dollar while en-
trusted to Treasury officials for authentication. 0 Relying ex-
tensively on Alliance,5 1 the court concluded that section
2680(c) "reaches only those claims asserting injury as a result
of the fact of detention itself where the propriety of the deten-
tion is at issue, and does not reach claims where the injury is
asserted to result from negligent handling of property in the
course of detention."52 One year later, the Ninth Circuit clari-
fied this position in United States v. Lockheed.53 The Lockheed
court dismissed a suit for lost revenues arising from the fact of
detention, stating that this was the type of claim Congress
meant to bar under section 2680(c).5
Five months prior to the Kosak decision, the Fifth Circuit
followed the Alliance precedent in A & D International, Inc. v.
United States.5 5 The Fifth Circuit stated that, had the plaintiff
proved negligence, the United States would have been liable
for five packets of gemstones lost while in the custody of cus-
toms officers.5 6 The A & D International court acknowledged
the conflict in the circuits as to the proper interpretation of sec-
49. 593 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 850.
51. Id.
52. Id. In his concurring opinion, Judge Tang read § 2680(c) as covering
only those detentions occurring within the context of customs and tax activi-
ties, because both necessarily require some period of detention. Since A-Mark
involved neither, Tang concluded that § 2680(c) should not bar the suit. Id. at
850-51 (Tang, J., concurring). This view, however, has not been advocated else-
where. Courts have not distinguished between customs and tax officials' activi-
ties and the activities of other government officials. See, e.g., United States v.
Lockheed, 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979) (involving Federal Aviation Administra-
tion officials).
53. 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 393. The court held that the owner of an aircraft detained by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for safety regulation violations could
not sue the United States for lost rental revenue, because the suit for damages
resulting from the fact of a negligent seizure was barred by § 2680(c). Id. at
397. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Lockheed from its prior decision in A-
Mark, see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text, stressing that A-Mark had
involved negligent damage to property by government officials during deten-
tion. In the case at bar, however, Lockheed had not asserted damage to its air-
craft as a result of negligent handling by the FAA, but rather was seeking lost
revenues arising from the fact of detention. Thus, Lockheed's claim was barred
by § 2680(c). Id. at 397 n.16.
55. 665 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 674. The court affirmed the district court's finding of no negli-
gence, because "[w]e cannot say that the findings of fact upon which the dis-
trict judge based his conclusions are clearly erroneous." Id.
1048 [Vol. 67:1040
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tion 2680(c), and found the Alliance decision, which limited im-
munity to claims for conversion due to the fact of detention, to
represent the more persuasive view.5 7 The Fifth Circuit recon-
ciled its decision in A & D International with its earlier deci-
sion in 19-Foot Boat by distinguishing 19-Foot Boat as involving
damages for the "fact of detention" of property, whereas A & D
International involved "negligent handling" of the property
during detention.5 8
As the above cases indicate, courts are split as to the
proper interpretation of section 2680(c). The Second, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits would allow recovery under that section in cases
in which the plaintiff proves negligence.59 The Fourth and Sev-
enth Circuits, however, would summarily dismiss a section
57. Id. at 672.
58. Id. at 673. The A & D International court differentiated between claims
involving the "fact of detention" of property and those involving the "negligent
handling" of the property. Id. at 672 n.2. In 19-Foot Boa4 the owner had chal-
lenged the propriety of storage charges as applied to him, "clearly the type of
suit which is excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)." Id. at 673. In A & D Interna-
tiona4 however, the plaintiff alleged carelessness in the handling of his prop-
erty, which is not excepted from the FTCA. Id.
The Fifth Circuit follows the absolute rule that a prior decision of the Cir-
cuit (panel or en banc) cannot be overruled by a panel, but only by the court
sitting en banc. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981). Since the court inA & D International was not sitting en banc, it had no
authority to overrule a prior decision. As A & D International has not been
challenged on these grounds, it should be accepted as merely clarifying the
Fifth Circuit's position in 19-Foot Boat.
59. See A & D International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.
1982); A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1978);
Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
The Eleventh Circuit might also fall into this category. The Fifth Circuit
was divided into two circuits in 1981, the Eleventh and the "new Fifth." Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94
Stat. 1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. V 1981)). The Eleventh
Circuit chose to adopt as precedent all decisions handed down by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals prior to Oct. 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, Ala., 661
F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981). This includes the 1974 decision in 19-Foot Boat.
In United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir.,
1981), the Eleventh Circuit, in dicta, indicated that 19-Foot Boat required bar-
ring a claim for damages due to negligent handling during detention. Id. at
1376. Shortly after the Douglas decision, however, the Fifth Circuit interpreted
19-Foot Boat in a manner inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion of its rule. A & D International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d at 673. See
supra note 58. When it adopted the Fifth Circuit decisions as precedent, the
Eleventh Circuit reserved for future consideration the effect of future en banc
decisions by the old Fifth Circuit changing what appeared to have been its rule
as of September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, Ala., 661 F.2d at 1209 n.5.
A & D International was not an en banc decision, but it could be interpreted as
changing the pre-September 30, 1981 rule. It could also be interpreted consist-
ently with that prior rule. See supra note 58. Thus, it is uncertain whether the
Eleventh Circuit will give any weight to the A & D International interpretation
of 19-Foot Boat, should the situation arise.
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2680(c) claim, 60 as would numerous district courts in other
circuits.6 1
The United States Supreme Court has done nothing to alle-
viate the confusion regarding section 2680(c), although it ad-
dressed an analogous situation in Hatzlatchh Supply Co. v.
United States.6 2 In Hatzlachh, the U.S. Customs Service seized
camera supplies, declaring the supplies forfeited for customs
violations.63 The Customs Service agreed to return the for-
feited goods upon payment of a $40,000 penalty.64 When the
supplies were returned, however, Hatzlachh claimed that mer-
chandise valued at $165,000 was missing.65
Hatzlachh sued the United States for damages. The suit,
however, was not brought under the FTCA.66 Instead, Hat-
zlachh brought suit under the Tucker Act,67 alleging breach of
an implied contract of bailment.68 The Court of Claims found
no mutual assent and thus no implied contract, since under
section 2680(c), "Congress has specifically precluded recovery
in claims arising from customs detentions . . .," and thus "it
would certainly be a trespass on congressional prerogatives" to
hold that the government assented to an implied-in-fact con-
60. See States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974);
United States v. 1500 Cases More or Less, Etc., 249 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1957).
Both cases, although stating an absolute rule barring claims under § 2680(c), in-
volved damages due to the fact of detention, not damages resulting from negli-
gent handling during detention.
61. See, e.g., S. Schonfeld Co. v. S.S. Akra Tenaron, 363 F. Supp. 1220 (D.
S.C. 1973).
62. 444 U.S. 460 (1980).
63. The supplies were seized pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1499, 1592 (1976) be-
cause their description as submitted to the Customs Service was erroneous.
64. Hatzlachh v. United States, 579 F.2d 617, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
65. 444 U.S. at 461.
66. The suit was brought under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2)
(1976), because of a longer statute of limitations period. Under the Tucker Act,
there is a six-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2501 (1976). The lim-
itation period for claims brought under the F.CA is two years. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(b) (1976).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1976). Petitioner also sought damages for loss of
"face and good will," but these were not at issue before the Supreme Court.
444 U.S. at 461 n.1. In addition, the Court did not consider the Court of Claim's
dismissal of petitioner's second cause of action, which alleged a "capricious and
arbitrary seizure," "unreasonable detainer" of property, and "deprivation with-
out due process." Id. at 461 n.2.
68. A bailment is created when goods or personal property are delivered
from one person to another either for deposit or for some particular use, under
either an express or implied contract which provides that, after the purpose of
delivery has been fulfilled, the property will either be returned to the person
who delivered it, disposed of according to that person's directions, or kept until
that person reclaims it. Simpkins v. Ritter, 189 Neb. 644, 647, 204 N.W.2d 383, 385
(1973).
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tract to return detained merchandise whole.69 On appeal, how-
ever, the Supreme Court determined that although Congress
had intended section 2680(c) to exclude certain claims from
tort liability, Congress has not intended that section to affect
immunity waivers contained in other statutes. The Court spe-
cifically refused to resolve the conflict as to the scope of immu-
nity under section 2680(c), but concluded that the section did
not preclude a claim that could be validly brought under the
Tucker Act.70 Finding that "the Court of Claims' judgment
rested heavily on a mistaken view of the legal significance of
§ 2680(c)," the Supreme Court remanded the case, instructing
the Court of Claims to "first address the question of an implied-
in-fact contract without regard to ... section [2680(c)]."71
In reaching its conclusion regarding the proper interpreta-
tion of section 2680(c), the Kosak majority acknowledged the
split in the circuits. 72 The court concluded, however, that the
Alliance rationale was incorrect and that section 2680(c)
barred all claims arising from detention,7 3 including the claim
raised by Kosak. In reaching its decision, the Kosak majority
first considered the "clear language of § 2680(c)" and the "ordi-
nary meaning of the words used."74 Based on these precepts of
statutory construction, the majority concluded that the stat-
ute's language unambiguously covered all claims arising out of
the detention of goods by the Customs Serice and did not pur-
port to distinguish among types of harm.75
The court also examined the legislative history of section
2680(c) and determined that Congress had justified the section,
along with other exceptions, as covering "claims which relate to
certain governmental activities which should be free from the
threat of damage suit, or for which adequate remedies are al-
ready available."76 The majority concluded that the section's
legislative history contained neither a "clearly expressed legis-
lative intention contrary to the ordinary meaning of the sec-
tion's language,"77 nor anything else indicating that Congress
intended the exemption to be limited only to claims for conver-
69. 579 F.2d at 621 (emphasis deleted).
70. 444 U.S. at 465-66.
71. Id. at 466.
72. 679 F.2d at 307.
73. Id. at 308-09.
74. Id. at 308.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946)).
77. 679 F.2d at 308.
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sion due to the fact of detention.7 8
Finally, the majority reinforced its conclusion that the Alli-
ance analysis was incorrect by interpreting the "purposes of
the statutory schema." 79 The Supreme Court's decision in
Dalehite v. United States, 8 0 the Kosak majority concluded, es-
tablished that despite passage of the FTCA, sovereign immu-
nity is still the rule and legislative departures from this rule
must be strictly construed.81 Finding no clear relinquishment
of sovereign immunity in either the statute's language or its
legislative history, the majority refused to recognize a depar-
ture from sovereign immunity and held that section 2680(c)
barred Kosak's claim.8 2
Judge Weis issued a strong dissent, categorizing Kosak's
loss as '"plainly the type that Congress intended to recom-
pense."8 3 Weis stated that both the statute's language and the
Alliance court's reasoning mandated this conclusion. 84 Judge
Weis also disagreed with the majority's premise that depar-
tures from sovereign immunity should be strictly construed,
finding strict construction necessary only to demarcate the
outer limits of the government's liability.85 Also relying on
Dalehite, he concluded that the specific exemptions to the
F CA should exclude the government from liability in "only
those circumstances which are within the words and reason of
the exception [to the FTCA]."86 Thus, Judge Weis urged that
section 2680(c) should not be interpreted expansively against
citizens to defeat the general waiver of immunity contained in
the FTCA, but rather should be limited to its terms. Because
the terms of section 2680(c) did not specifically bar Kosak's
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, the Supreme Court held that the United
States was not liable under the discretionary function exception (2680(a)) for
death resulting from an explosion at a fertilizer plant owned by the govern-
ment. Id. at 45.
81. 679 F.2d at 308.
82. Id. at 308-09. "[C]ourts include only those circumstances which are
within the words and reason of the exception. They cannot do less since peti-
tioners obtain their 'right to sue from Congress [and they] necessarily must
take [that right] subject to such restrictions as have been imposed."' Id. at 309
(quoting Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 251 (1940)). "So
our decisions have interpreted the Act to require clear relinquishment of sover-
eign immunity to give jurisdiction for tort actions." 679 F.2d at 309 (quoting
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953) (footnote omitted)).
83. 679 F.2d at 309 (Weis, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 310.
85. Id. at 309-10.
86. Id. (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953)).
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claim, he concluded that Kosak should be allowed to recover.8 7
An analysis of the purpose of the FTCA and the exceptions
contained in section 2680(c) indicates that the Kosak dissent,
not the majority, stated the correct rule of construction.8 8 The
FTCA was enacted as a general waiver of sovereign immunity,
primarily in response to the prevalent feeling that "[i]t ought
to be fundamental in a democracy that an individual who is in-
jured should not be deprived of redress merely because he was
injured by governmental activity."89 In tort, contrary to what
the Kosak majority claimed, sovereign immunity is no longer
87. 679 F.2d at 309-10.
88. Although technically correct that a clear relinquishment of sovereign
immunity is required before it will be acknowledged by the courts, the majority
fails to point out that whether a clear relinquishment is intended depends on
the "words and reason of the exception." Id. at 308. Referring to the FTCA ex-
ceptions, the Supreme Court in Dalehite stated that "these modifications are
entitled to a construction that will accomplish their aim, that is, one that will
carry out the legislative purpose of allowing suits against the Government for
negligence with due regard for the statutory exceptions to that policy." 346 U.S.
at 31 (footnote omitted). This statement supports the Kosak dissent's conten-
tion that liability should be allowed, except when it would harm the govern-
ment, because preventing such harm was precisely the reason for the statutory
exceptions. 679 F.2d at 310 (Weis, J., dissenting). In the absence of such harm,
the general policy of allowing claims for negligence against the government
should control, and thus the scope of the exceptions must be construed strictly
to conform to the elimination of the governmental harm they were designed to
obviate. This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's prior state-
ment in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951), that "Where a stat-
ute [the FTCA] contains a clear and sweeping waiver of immunity from suit on
all claims with certain well-defined exceptions, resort to that rule [of strict con-
struction] cannot be had in order to enlarge the exceptions." Id. at 548-49 n.5
(quoting Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir.
1948)).
89. Mikva, supra note 13, at 847.
Private employers are held vicariously liable for torts committed by their
employees during the course of their employment under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th ed.
1971). There are several reasons for this doctrine. First, there is a strong feel-
ing that an employer who is engaged in an enterprise that will involve harm to
others through an employees' torts should bear the cost of the employees' torts,
not the innocent victim. Id. The employer is also better able to absorb the cost
and to distribute this cost to the community at large. Id. Furthermore, the im-
position of liability encourages employers to carefully select, instruct, and su-
pervise employees and to take every precaution to insure that the enterprise is
conducted safely. Id. Finally, a plaintiff often cannot recover from an individ-
ual employee because he or she cannot identify the negligent employee, or be-
cause the employee is judgment-proof due to insufficient assets, and thus
without the respondeat superior doctrine that plaintiff would be denied recov-
ery. Id. at 237, 459.
In most instances, all of the reasons for holding nongovernmental employ-
ers liable also support the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to
agencies of the government. Denial of liability would thus be denying recovery
solely because the government was the defendant.
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the rule. Rather, sovereign immunity is an exception to the
general condition of governmental waiver of immunity and is
exercised only in circumstances in which immunity has been
considered necessary to protect certain governmental interests.
Consequently, the section 2680(c) exception must be read to
deprive an innocent victim of recovery only when liability
would harm the government. Interpreting the language, legisla-
tive history, and logic of section 2680(c) consistently with this
principal highlights the flaws in the Kosak majority's analysis.
Contrary to the Kosak majority's conclusion,9 0 the specific
language used in section 2680(c) does not unambiguously bar
all claims resulting from detention. Instead the language indi-
cates congressional intent that the phrase "any claim arising in
respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs
duty or the detention of any goods or merchandise" 9' apply
only to the fact of detention itself, and not to the broader area
of claims arising during detention.92 The term used to describe
the causal nexus between the governmental acts and the injury
suffered is unique to subsection (c).93 Although other subsec-
tions specify injuries "arising from,"94 "caused by,"95 and "aris-
ing out of"96 the government's actions, subsection (c) is the
only section barring liability in suits "arising in respect of" de-
fined governmental conduct. This precise difference in wording
suggests that Congress did not immunize losses after deten-
tion-arguably arising "out of" or "from" the detention, or
"caused by" the detention.9 7
Furthermore, courts have noted that Congress specified the
90. 679 F.2d at 308. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976).
92. For a discussion of this interpretation, see Justice Weis's dissenting
opinion in Kosak 679 F.2d at 309-10.
93. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Hatzlachh v. United States, 444 U.S. 460
(1980).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(1) (1976) ("arising from the activities of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority"); id. § 2680(m) ("arising from the activities of the
Panama Canal Company"); id. § 2680(n) ("arising from the activities of a Fed-
eral land bank. ..").
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(f) (1976) ("caused by the imposition or establish-
ment of a quarantine . . ."); id. § 2680(i) ("caused by the fiscal operations of
the Treasury. ..").
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) ("arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negli-
gent transmission of... postal matter"); id. § 2680(e) ("arising out of an act or
omission of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions
of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix"); id. § 2680(h) ("arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,.. ."); id. § 2680(j) ("arising out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces. .
97. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 19.
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scope of exempted damages in other subsections. 98 For exam-
ple, subsection (b) expressly bars actions "arising out of the
loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matters."99 Subsection (c), on the other hand, makes no refer-
ence to any type of damage based on the negligent destruction,
injury, or loss of goods in the possession of customs authorities.
Moreover, Congress could have applied the language of subsec-
tions (j), dealing with military activities, 0 0 and (1), involving
activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority,101 to subsection
(c) and provided a broad exemption for "any claim arising from
the activities" of the Customs Service. It did not do so. Nor did
Congress use language comparable to that of subsection (e), di-
rected toward government employees generally,102 to bar "any
claim arising out of an act or omission.., in administering the
provisions" of, in this case, the customs law. Since Congress
considered the FTCA for thirty years before adopting a final
draft,103 it is reasonable to conclude that this difference in sub-
section (c)'s language must be intentional and is meant to limit
the exception to the fact of detention. 04
Additional evidence that Congress intended to restrict im-
munity to the fact of detention is indicated by a comparison of
subsection (c) with subsection (h).105 Subsection (h). excludes
98. See, e.g., A & D International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669, 672 (5th
Cir. 1982); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529, 534 (2d Cir.
1958).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1976).
100. Id. § 2680(j).
101. Id. § 2680(1).
102. Id. § 2680(e).
103. W. WmGHT, supra note 19, at 5. "Although the shape of the FICA was
largely determined in the course of the 77th Congress, it is obvious that this
was anything but a spontaneous product of that Congress." 1 I JAYSON, supra
note 9, § 60.
104. Other exceptions have been limited to their precise language. For ex-
ample, the government has been held liable for injuries caused by the negligent
driving of postal employees delivering mail. Although this type of injury could
perhaps be considered one "arising out of the ... negligent transmission of
mail," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1976), the subsection's language has not been ex-
panded to encompass this type of injury. See, e.g., Obst v. United States Postal
Service, 427 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In fact, a 1961 amendment to the
FTCA made a suit against the government the sole remedy in any "driver"
case. Pub. L No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b)-(e) (1976)). In light of this treatment given to other subsections, sub-
section (c) should likewise not be expanded to cover more than Congress
intended.
105. Subsection (h) excludes "any claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-
der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1976).
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"any claims arising out of... false imprisonment, [or] false ar-
rest .... " The language of subsection (h)--"arising out of"--
could have been read to exclude all claims resulting from false
imprisonment, including those due to the negligence of prison
employees during imprisonment.10e The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has held that the government is liable for injuries to pris-
oners resulting from federal employees' negligence. 0 7
Therefore, subsection (h) excludes only claims due to the fact
of false imprisonment, not claims for negligence during impris-
onment. The language of subsection (c)---"arising in respect
of"--is similar to, and even narrower than, that of subsection
(h),108 suggesting that the two sections were intended to bar
the same types of claims.10 9 Thus, subsection (c) should be in-
terpreted consistently with subsection (h) to exclude only
claims due to the fact of detention, and to allow claims for dam-
ages caused by the negligence of government employees occur-
ring during detention.
In addition to improperly analyzing the language of section
2680(c), the Kosak majority erroneously interpreted the stat-
ute's legislative history. The majority correctly included sec-
tion 2680(c) in the group of exemptions that "relate to certain
governmental activities which should be free from the threat of
damage suit, or for which adequate remedies are already avail-
able.""1o The majority failed, however, to recognize that two
different categories of exemptions are part of this group: those
relating to activities in which Congress felt the government
needed immunity from liability, and those in which Congress
decided that a waiver of immunity was unnecessary because
injured plaintiffs could already sue the government under ex-
isting statutes.
Evidence indicates that section 2680(c) was included in the
106. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
107. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 158 (1963) (holding the govern-
ment liable under the FTCA for the assault of one prisoner and blindness in
another prisoner caused by prison officials' negligent actions). See also Aston
v. United States, 625 F.2d 1210, 1211 (5th Cir. 1980) ("some injuries sustained by
federal prisoners are compensible under the Federal Tort Claims Act," al-
though the "prison compensation law," 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1976), was the exclu-
sive remedy for a federal prisoner injured while working); Cline v. Herman, 601
F.2d 374, 375 (8th Cir. 1979) (claim that U.S. deputy marshalls negligently sub-
jected prisoner to assault is cognizable under the FrCA). In each of these
cases, liability was considered only under the FrCA, without reference to any
constitutional issues.
108. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
110. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
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latter category of exemptions-exemptions that ought to be re-
tained because sufficient remedies already existed. As such,
section 2680(c) would apply only to challenges to the propriety
of the detention"' and the duty assessed,1 2 because preexist-
ing remedies were available only in these areas. When Alexan-
der Holtzoff, principal spokesperson for the Executive Branch
on the FTCA, testified before a subcommittee of the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee, he stated that subsection (c) was included
because the remedies for damages from the detention of goods
by customs officers were already sufficient."13 Most legal com-
mentators agree with this characterization of subsection (c),114
as did the United States Supreme Court in Hatzlachh."5s The
existing remedies covered claims due to the fact of detention.
Since no particular statutory procedure existed for recovery for
loss or damage of goods while in a customs official's posses-
sion," 6 Congress could not have intended section 2680(c) to
preclude such claims.
Even if Congress actually intended section 2680(c) to fall
within the other category of exemptions-those barring claims
relating to "certain governmental activities which should be
free from the threat of a damage suit,"1 7 -there is no evidence
that the section was aimed at claims for negligent handling dur-
ing detention. The exceptions included in section 2680 reflect
general congressional concern about liability for certain types
of governmental activity. The government is immune from lia-
111. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1618 (1976); United States Customs Service Adminis-
trative Review, 19 C.F.R. § 173-173.6 (1982).
112. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1516 (1976); United States Customs Service Adminis-
trative Review, 19 C.F.R. § 173-173.6 (1982).
113. Tort Claims against the U.S.: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1940).
114. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 45 (indicating that the basis for the
customs exceptions "lies in the existence of an adequate, subsisting remedy
upon which suits against the United States have heretofore been entertained");
Note, supra note 14, at 547 (placing § 2680(c) in a group of exceptions enacted
"because of satisfactory provisions already made for handling the claims cov-
ered"). See also 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 9, §§ 225, 256; Gellhorn & Schenck,
supra note 9, at 729-30.
115. 444 U.S. at 462 n.4. The Court indicated that "the purpose of § 2680(c)
was to avoid duplication; there was no indication that existing remedies, if any,
were withdrawn." Id.
116. Customs officers were held liable for their own negligence at the time
§ 2680(c) was enacted. Congress could not have feared that the FTCA would
preclude that remedy, however, because enactment of the FTCA did not affect
the long-established practice of permitting suits against customs officers in
their individual capacities. See States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d
1146, 1148-51 (4th Cir. 1974). Therefore, Congress did not include individual lia--
bility as one of the existing remedies to be preserved by § 2680(c).
117. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
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bility in cases where fiscal policy,"18 foreign relations,119 or
emergency situations120 are involved. Also precluded are ac-
tions that involve the discretion and judgment of federal offi-
cials.121 Likewise, subsection (c), which deals in part with taxes
and duties, involves one of the areas of congressional concern,
that of fiscal policy. 22 Claims resulting from the fact of deten-
tion deal with discretion and judgment, another stated area of
concern.123 Claims due to negligent handling during detention,
however, do not fit into any of the areas of congressional con-
cern suggested by the other exemptions. Furthermore, Con-
gress would not have viewed these claims as jeopardizing
governmental stability to the same extent as claims involving
"foreign relations" or "emergency situations." Nor would it
have viewed immunity from these claims as essential to the ef-
ficient functioning of the Customs Service. 24
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976) ("the assessment or collection of any tax
or customs duty"); id. § 2680(i) ("fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the
regulation of the monetary system"); id. § 2680(n) ("activities of a Federal land
bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives").
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1976) ("claims or suits in admiralty"); id.
§ 2680(k) ("arising in a foreign country"); id. § 2680(m) ("activities of the Pan-
ama Canal Company").
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(e) (1976) (concerning war and national defense);
id. § 2680(f) ("imposition or establishment of a quarantine"); id. § 2680(j)
("combatant activities... during time of war").
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) ("discretionary function"); id. § 2680(e)
("administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50"); id. § 2680(h) ("as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights"). Certain categories under subsection (h) could also involve "emer-
gency situations." Id.
Although not all of the provisions of § 2680 deal with fiscal policy, foreign
relations, emergency situations, or discretion and judgment, they can be distin-
guished from subsection (c) on other grounds. Subsection (d), regarding suits
in admiralty, is justified because other available remedies are sufficient. See
supra notes 16-17. Subsection (1), excluding suits arising from the activities of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, was included because there was a pre-existing
remedy. The TVA, a government corporation, is authorized by statute to sue or
be sued in its corporate name. 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (1976). Finally, subsection
(b), relating to postal matters, is justified because of extreme necessity. See in-
fra note 124.
122. See supra note 118.
123. See supra note 121.
124. This rationale has been used to justify excluding the Post Office from
liability. Holding the Post Office liable for negligent handling could force that
office to begin hand-sorting all mail in order to avoid damage caused by sorting
machines. This could increase the cost of mail delivery to the point where indi-
viduals could not afford it, and would also drastically slow down mail service.
A. SUmmERFELD, U.S. MAIe 10-12, 182-87 (1960). Thus, freedom from liability al-
lows the post office to function efficiently and economically. The Customs Serv-
ice, however, is not comparable to the Post Office in this respect. Machines are
not used to sort entering or exiting goods. Moreover, the number of goods de-
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Admittedly, Congress may have concluded that freedom
from the threat of suits for conversion is essential to enable
customs officials to function efficiently. Without such immu-
nity, customs officials may become reluctant to properly detain
goods.125 There is no evidence, however, that Congress felt the
Customs Service should have a license to be negligent during
detention.126 Subjecting the Customs Service to liability in cer-
tain instances would not undermine its authority and effective-
ness any more than it undermines the authority of other
agencies subject to liability for negligence.127 There is no rea-
son to distinguish the Customs Service from these other agen-
cies once customs officials' power to seize and hold goods is
protected. Moreover, Congress could not have feared that al-
lowing recovery would threaten the government financially, be-
cause the government reimbursed most customs officials found
individually liable even before the FTCA was enacted.128 Thus,
section 2680(c) could not have been intended to protect the
government from harm due to damages caused during
detention.
The Kosak majority rejected the Alliance conclusion that
section 2680(c) does not apply to claims for negligent handling
during detention, finding that the Alliance court ignored "the
clear language of § 2680(c), the legislative intent, and specific
teachings of the Supreme Court regarding interpretation of ex-
ceptions to the FTCA."129 Not only was the Kosak majority's
determination that Alliance was wrong based on an incorrect
analysis of section 2680(c),1 30 it was also contrary to the three
other most recent decisions interpreting that section.13' Fur-
tained by the Customs Service is much smaller than the number of goods han-
dled by the Post Office. Id. The Customs Service thus does not need special
treatment comparable to that given to the Post Office.
125. If customs officials feared liability for conversion because of detention,
officials might be less likely to detain and adequately inspect goods. This is es-
pecially true of more expensive goods, when potentially high damages for con-
version might be involved. Less rigorous inspections could lead to the entrance
of more illegal goods into the country or the failure to pay requisite duties.
126. This view was expressed by the Alliance court. See supra text accom-
panying note 40.
127. All government agencies not excluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) are
subject to liability. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
128. See Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 76, 12 Stat. 741 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2006
(1976)).
129. 679 F.2d at 308.
130. See supra notes 90-128 and accompanying text.
131. In A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F.2d 849, 850 (9th
Cir. 1978), see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text, the Ninth Circuit
awarded damages for losses which occurred during detention, while in United
States v. Lockheed, 656 F.2d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1979), see supra notes 53-54 and
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thermore, neither Schonfeld nor 19-Foot Boat, the only deci-
sions cited by the Kosak majority to support its position,
provides a strong basis for rejecting the Alliance rationale.
Schonfeld132 is based on an incorrect reading of section 2680(c).
The Schonfeld court stated that "the statute specifically bars
'any claim' arising out of the detention of goods."' 33 The statu-
tory language, however, is "in respect of," not "arising out of," a
difference that seems to broaden the scope of section
2680(c).134
Furthermore, 19-Foot Boat,135 the other case cited by
Kosak, was later interpreted by the Fifth Circuit in A & D In-
ternational as consistent with Alliance, 13 6 and thus necessarily
inconsistent with the Kosak result. The Kosak court at-
tempted to discredit the A & D International interpretation,
claiming that prior to A & D International the Supreme Court
in Hatzlachh had interpreted 19-Foot Boat as a decision con-
trary to Alliance.13 7 The Kosak majority concluded that the A
& D International interpretation of 19-Foot Boat was therefore
contrary to the Supreme Court's interpretation. The Supreme
Court, however, never directly construed 19-Foot Boat. The
Court simply referred to the Hatzlachh petitioner's characteri-
accompanying text, it dismissed a claim for lost revenues arising from the fact
of detention as falling within the ambit of § 2680(c). The Fifth Circuit likewise
found the Alliance rationale persuasive in A & D International, Inc. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 669, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1982), see supra notes 55-58 and accompany-
ing text, there characterizing "negligent handling" of detained property as a
compensible loss not barred by § 2680(c).
A recent case, United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d
1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 1981), appears in dicta to agree with the Kosak court that
§ 2680(c) bars all claims. This conclusion, however, was simply based on the
Eleventh Circuit's reading of the Fifth Circuit's 19-Foot Boat decision. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit adopted Fifth Circuit decisions as precedent. See supra note
59. The Fifth Circuit has since clarified its 19-Foot Boat position in A & D Inter-
national. What the Eleventh Circuit will now hold as precedent is unpredict-
able, as is what the court would decide should it actually address the issue.
Thus, Douglas is not definitive of the Eleventh Circuit's position. It was not
even cited as support by the Kosak majority.
132. 363 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.C. 1973).
133. Id. at 1223.
134. The Kosak dissent called this a "subtle, but nevertheless significant
distinction." 679 F.2d at 310 (Weis, J., dissenting). This difference widens the
scope of the exception. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
135. 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
136. 665 F.2d at 672-73. See supra note 58.
137. 679 F.2d at 307 n.3. The Kosak majority also claimed that the A & D In-
ternational court actually misread the 19-Foot Boat decision, concluding that
"it is clear that the owner of the boat counterclaimed for damage to his prop-
erty while it was in storage," making the claim one for damages occurring after
the fact of detention. Id.
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zation of 19-Foot Boat as contrary to Alliance.138 Conse-
quently, the Kosak majority had no basis on which to disavow
the A & D International interpretation and to claim that 19-Foot
Boat supports the Kosak decision.
As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Hatzlachh re-
fused to interpret section 2680(c).13 9 The Court's decision, how-
ever, most likely supports a narrow reading of the section, a
fact the Kosak majority ignored. After reversing the Court of
Claims ruling that the language of section 2680(c) precluded
suit under the Tucker Act, the Supreme Court remanded the
Hatzlachh case, instructing the Court of Claims to determine
whether an implied-in-fact contract existed. 40 The Supreme
Court determined that, if the Court of Claims found an implied-
in-fact contract to return the goods whole existed between cus-
toms officials and the individual whose property was being in-
spected, the government would be liable under the Tucker Act
for any damages.' 4 1 Holding the Customs Service liable under
the Tucker Act, of course, would virtually eliminate a major
reason courts have used for barring claims under section
2680(c)-that customs officials need absolute freedom from any
threat of liability in order to function efficiently. 42 Such a deci-
sion would also imply a liberal view of customs officers' liability
generally and the scope of section 2680(c) specifically, 43 since
it is unlikely that a court reluctant to "judicially admit at the
back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the
front door"44 would allow a suit in contract that Congress
138. 444 U.S. at 462 n.3.
139. Id. at 462-63 n.3.
140. Id. at 466.
141. Id. The Supreme Court determined that the § 2680(c) exception to the
F CA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976), was not intended to preclude liability under
the Tucker Act. See supra note 15.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 117-28.
143. But cf. Note, The Supreme Court and the Tort Claims Act: End of an
Enlightened Era?, 27 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 267, 268 (1978). The author contends
that, although the Supreme Court has previously viewed the FTCA as a broad
waiver of immunity, with a correspondingly narrow view of the application of
its statutory exceptions, recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a definite
shift away from the Court's broad view of the Act and towards a much nar-
rower concept of governmental tort liability. Id. The Court recently has re-
fused to presume that the absence of an applicable exception to the FTCA
weighs in favor of allowing recovery in close cases. Id. at-292. The author be-
lieves the Court has rejected the idea that the FICA was intended to be a
sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity, and now perceives that congressional
intent was to grudgingly relinquish immunity. Id. 'The basic doctrinal posi-
tion of the Burger Court seems to be that the government is in need of fiscal
protection from the tort claims of its citizens." Id.
144. Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (dis-
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meant to prohibit in tort.
The decision to remand strongly suggests that the Supreme
Court intended the Court of Claims to find an implied-in-fact
contract. As Justice Blackmun's dissent points out, if there
were no implied-in-fact contract, "the remand is, or should be, a
useless exercise leading to an inevitable result."' 45 Had the
Supreme Court determined that no implied-in-fact contract ex-
isted, the Court could have affirmed the Court of Claims' deci-
sion, albeit on a different ground, either because no contract
existed or because, as Justice Blackmun claims, any contract is
one implied in law, not in fact, and thus not covered by the
Tucker Act.146 Furthermore, the Court of Claims indicated that
an implied-in-fact contract would exist under the circum-
stances present in Hatzlachh if some implied or express agree-
ment counteracted the bar of section 2680(c).147 By removing
the bar of section 2680(c), the Supreme Court was aware that
the Court of Claims would probably find an implied contract.
The Kosak dissent makes clear that the majority's view of
section 2680(c) produces anomolous results.14 8 If a traveller
hands an expensive oriental vase to a customs officer for in-
spection and the officer carelessly drops it, damages are paya-
ble under the FTCA.149 On the other hand, if that same officer
carelessly drops the vase during detention, the traveller is
without remedy.150 Congress could not have meant to produce
missing a suit brought by a National Guard officer for injuries resulting from
his aircraft's faulty ejection system, claiming that the malfunction was due to
faulty government specifications and components).
145. 444 U.S. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Blackmun reasoned that the government's action was a claim of forfei-
ture and an assertion of ownership. Id. If the forfeiture were not upheld, the
duty to return the goods would be one not implied-in-fact, but rather one im-
plied-in-law stemming from the duty imposed on the Customs Service by 28
U.S.C. § 2465 (1976). 444 U.S. at 467. Recovery under implied-in-law contracts is
not allowed by the Tucker Act. See supra note 15.
147. The Court of Claims stated:
We do not consider the present decisions as necessarily controlling a
case in which there were additional facts from which an implied or ex-
press agreement could possibly arise, e.g., a promise, representation or
statement that the goods would be guarded or carefully handled. It is
conceivable to us that, in such circumstances, a claim might lie under
the Tucker Act even though 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) might still preclude re-
covery under the Tort Claims Act.
579 F.2d at 621.
148. 679 U.S. at 309 (Weis, J., dissenting).
149. Id. This injury would presumably not be one arising in respect of the
detention of goods by customs and thus not excepted under § 2680(c).
150. Id. The traveller can still sue the official individually, however, pro-
vided the negligent official can be identified. States Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (4th Cir. 1974).
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such inconsistent and unfair results under an Act intended to
remedy inconsistency and unfairness.
The Kosak decision incorrectly analyzes the language, leg-
islative history, and purpose of section 2680(c). Furthermore,
its interpretation is contrary to the recent trend to follow the
Alliance rationale and "do equity."151 The Third Circuit's opin-
ion will lend support to those courts opposed to the expansion
of individual rights against the government, as well as those
courts wishing to deny recovery to a particular plaintiff. The
Kosak case will also lend support to those courts that do not
wish to fully consider the issue.1 5 2
The Kosak decision emphasizes the need for an absolute
determination that section 2680(c) bars only those claims for
conversion due to the fact of detention, but allows those based
on negligent handling during detention. 53 The United States
Supreme Court will be in a position to make this determination
during the 1983 term, when it reviews the Kosak case.15 As
advocated in this Comment, the statute's language and legisla-
tive history adequately support such a determination. Without
a Supreme Court declaration, some courts will refuse to allow
plaintiffs whose property has been negligently damaged during
customs detention to sue the government for the negligence of
customs officers. Judicial adherence to this construction of sec-
tion 2680(c) is contrary to the equitable purposes of the
151. See supra note 131.
152. Determining that § 2680(c) precludes recovery does not require any ra-
tionalization, especially when precedent is available. This is indicated by ear-
lier decisions based on this subsection. See, e.g., supra note 26. This approach
may prove attractive to courts with extremely crowded dockets.
153. The current language is "arising in respect of ... the detention of
goods." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976).
154. If for some reason the Supreme Court does not make a final determina-
tion of the scope of § 2680(c), Congress could amend the section to remove any
possible ambiguity. Congress could either specify that § 2680(c) denies only
those claims "for conversion due to the fact of detention of any goods" or, alter-
natively, add a proviso stating "[t]his section is in no way intended to bar
claims for damages caused by the negligent handling of goods during deten-
tion." Either form of amendment would eliminate the inconsistent application
of § 2680(c) that has resulted from the statute's current imprecise language. A
third alternative would be for the Customs Service to issue regulations estab-
lishing their liability for goods damaged by negligent handling. Currently, how-
ever, the Customs Service has limited its regulations in this area to refunding
any duties paid for goods lost by the Service, stolen while in the public stores,
or damaged by an accidental fire or other casualty. 19 C.F.R. § 158.21 (1982).
The Customs Service would probably not be anxious to increase its own liabil-
ity, as evidenced by its past failure to issue any such regulations. This solution
thus does not appear to be a viable alternative.
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FTCA.155 Persons who are required to temporarily relinquish
their valuables to the government should not be denied recov-
ery for damages due to customs officials' negligent handling of
their property, simply because they had the misfortune to be
injured by the government.
155. 'The purpose of the bill [FTCA] is to relieve Congress from an intoler-
able situation which exists in the matter of adjudication of claims. The machin-
ery heretofore devised or used in Congress, having completely broken down, is
no longer a medium of justice or equity toward our citizens." H.R. REP. No. 667,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926).
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